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It is not so easy […] to continue telling macroeconomic stories 
that rely on a theory of general equilibrium dynamics 
abandoned over a decade ago by most serious investigators. The 
tâtonnement cannot be considered a harmless “as if” 
assumption if it is logically inconsistent with other 
assumptions in the models we use (Weintraub, 1977, p.14). 
 
 
Within just five years from the above forceful warning  by Roy Weintraub 
against the inadequacy of the Walrasian auctioneer to logically produce any 
interesting real-time macroeconomic issues, the appearance of two 
complementary papers contributed to establish the currently dominant 
scientific standard in macroeconomics. The two papers were written by Robert 
Lucas (1980) and Fynn Kydland and Edward Prescott (1982), respectively. 
Both of them 1) acknowledged the analysis of macroeconomic fluctuations as a 
relevant research question; 2) proposed a view of aggregate dynamics in terms 
of the general equilibrium response of rational maximizing individuals to 
random changes in production possibilities and resource constraints; 3) made 
use of the contingent-claim interpretation of a Walrasian general equilibrium, 
as originally proposed by Arrow (1964) and Debreu (1959); 4) identified (the 
former) and implemented (the second) a brand new strategy to assess the 
predictive success of theoretical statements. While the theoretical 
underpinnings of the resulting Real Business Cycle (RBC) model1 have been 
sensibly refined during the following three decades of active research – in that 
important non-Walrasian features like imperfect competition and incomplete 
intertemporal markets have been introduced –, the core of the solution concept 
invariably rests (explicitly or not) on a fictitious centralized auctioneer that 
costlessly collects and disseminates information, adjusts prices and quantities, 
and organizes and executes trades.  
                                                 
1 The attempt by Lucas to build a monetary theory of business cycles in terms of informational 
asymmetries and misperceptions in a Walrasian framework (Lucas, 1972,; 1975) was discarded as 
logically inconsistent by Okun (1980) and Tobin (1980), precisely in that same issue of the Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking hosting the piece by Lucas cited in the main text. Lucas himself implicitly 
recognized it five years later, when he focused his 1985 Yrjö Jahnsson lectures on business cycles entirely 
on the RBC approach of Kydland and Prescott (Lucas, 1987).     2
The list of logical problems affecting microfoundations rooted in the 
Arrow-Debreu tradition is rather long and widely known. Just to cite some of 
them, it must be noticed that: i) the conventional general equilibrium theory 
has difficulties in finding a role for monetary exchange; ii) the equilibrium is 
neither unique nor locally stable under general conditions; iii) the introduction 
of a representative agent (RA) is done without paying any attention to 
composition and aggregation fallacies; iv) any tâtonnement process occurs in a 
meta-time, and implies that the formation of prices precedes the process of 
exchange, instead of being the result of it. The interested reader can consult 
Kirman (1989), Hartley (1997) and Hildebrand (1994) for wide-ranging 
discussions.   
In spite of all its weaknesses, the practice of modeling an economy worth 
several trillion dollars by means of a rational optimizing Robinson Crusoe in 
continuous equilibrium has became the scientific standard of modern 
macroeconomics, also known as Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium 
(DSGE) theory. Certainly, Weintraub’s general idea that “[…]rich, flexible, and 
rigorous general equilibrium models help to provide a vision of the microfoundations of 
macroeconomics” (Weintraub, 1977, p.2) circulates nowadays almost undisputed 
among the profession. Sadly, his admonition to carefully work out the 
conceptual basis of the type of general equilibrium theory to be employed has 
however gone almost unheard. The scientific practice dominating 
macroeconomics today can be condensed by the sharp metaphor put forth by 
Axel Leijonhufvud (1998), according to whom economists doing research 
within the DSGE approach tell stories using the same expositive technique of 
Beckett and Pirandello: “[…] the economist of today expects to see a solitary 
representative agent, under the mathematical spotlight on a bare and denuded stage, 
asking agonizing questions of himself: ‘What does it all mean?’ […] or ‘I know I have 
optimized, but – is that all there is?’” (Leijonhufvud, 1998, p.199).   
In fact, it should be noted that modern mainstream macroeconomics is in 
striking contrast with the institutionally oriented, behaviorally adaptive, 
dynamically rich stories told by economists belonging to the British Classical 
Tradition (Leijonhufvud, 1999). Although giants of economic thought like 
Alfred Marshall sometimes used RAs as a modeling tool, those agents were 
employed only as a means of thinking through what sorts of variables belong 
in aggregate relationships. No attempts were made to derive aggregate 
functions from the solution of a dynamic optimization problem posed to a 
representative consumer/worker. Marshall’s stories about the ordinary business 
of life were filled in with asymmetric information, incomplete contracting,   3
exchange-supporting and coordination-enhancing institutions, and process-
regarding preferences. The complexity resulting from the interactions of all 
these constituents clashes with the reductionist approach of modern 
macroeconomics, as well with the mathematical tools employed by modern 
macroeconomists to substantiate it. As regards this latter point, advocates of 
DSGE typically use fixed-point theorems to solve choice-theoretic problems 
consistent with the tenets of Subjective Expected Utility theory. It must be 
noted however, that equilibrium solutions can be derived only if one assumes 
that: i) each agent has full knowledge of the problem; ii) he is perfectly able to 
compute the solution; iii) there is common knowledge that all agents are 
operating under requirements i) and ii).2 No surprise, therefore, that the 
Classical way of writing economic tales does not “[…] appeal to modern tastes. 
Too many characters on stage: the consumer, the worker, the banker, the entrepreneur, 
the stock market speculator, and more. And who has patience with the antics that 
result from the rigid idiosyncrasies and informational asymmetries of this cast? It 
smack of Commedia dell’Arte” (Leijonhufvud, 1998, p.199).       
In this paper we shall argue that a method to construct and analyze 
interesting macroeconomic issues with microfoundations based on 
heterogeneous, adaptive, decentralized processes of individual decision-
making – a là Commedia dell’Arte − is not only feasible, but also that the models 
one obtains in this way can rival the explanatory power of DSGE models. 
Since we endorse the view according to which “[…] a general equilibrium model 
is simply some specification of states of the world and a set of rules that structure the 
manner in which those states change over time” (Weintraub, 1977, p.2), our theory 
is firmly rooted in the tradition of general equilibrium analysis. However, we 
depart from its Walrasian interpretation in that we explicitly model an 
evolving network of fully decentralized trades among adaptive agents. The 
explanations we propose, instead of being derived deductively from the 
exogenous imposition of a fictitious centralized auctioneer, are generated from 
a systematic analysis of general interactions by means of an agent-based 
computational laboratory.   
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 contains some 
methodological ruminations about how the agent-based computational 
approach can be employed to provide sound microfoundations to 
macroeconomic theory. Section 3 presents the key features of a prototypical 
                                                 
2 Fixed-point theorems are also at the root of some impossibility results in computable 
economics. We will briefly touch on this point later on.   4
agent-based computational laboratory suited to address macroeconomic 
issues, while its ability to replicate some well-known stylized facts of the 
business cycle is assessed in Section 4. Section 5 is  a summary and conclusion. 
 
2. A generative approach to macroeconomics 
In his introduction to the equilibrium approach to business cycle theory, Lucas 
(1980) identified two key sources of scientific development. The first source 
consists in improvements in mathematical methods and computational 
capacity. The second one is the identification of statistical regularities - or 
stylized facts - which should help us in organizing theoretical reasoning and in 
devising assessment − i.e., falsifying − strategies. Of course, these two 
principles can be accepted as universal pre-conditions of scientific progress 
holding regardless of the scientific paradigm one is working in. In briefly 
sketching the grounds for an agent-based approach to macroeconomics, we 
will elaborate on both in turn.  
In the following we do not have any pretension of originality. The material 
we shall present is basically an idiosyncratic re-combination of hints and 
intuitions scattered in the pioneering work of towering figures like Armen 
Alchian, Friedrich von Hayek, Axel Leijonhufvud, Thomas Schelling and 
Herbert Simon. Their influence is so pervasive that we prefer to give them full 
credit now, and to limit references in what follows to save space. The value 
added of the present piece is merely to insert their insights into a unifying 
research program aimed at providing sound microfoundations to 
macroeconomic analysis.  
It should be said at the outset that we convincingly endorse the view that 
any economy – and particularly large economies, composed of millions of 
individual entities − may and should be described as a complex, adaptive, 
dynamic system (Arthur et al., 1997). In such a system, complexity arises 
because of the dispersed, localized, non-linear interactions of a large number 
of heterogeneous components. While we can naturally observe and measure 
the aggregate output of the system – quantity and price indexes and their 
growth rates, for instance −, aggregates could not be derived directly from an 
examination of the behavior of a typical individual in isolation. Global 
properties emerge from the market and non-market interactions of people 
without them being part of their intentions, a notion which clearly resembles 
the time-honored invisible hand metaphor of Adam Smith (Leijonhufvud, 1995).   5
From this standpoint, a microfoundation strategy which assumes individuals’ 
heterogeneity and interactions away like the RA approach is not just over-
simplistic; it simply represents an incorrect scientific practice.   
This shift of perspective has two deep implications for economic theory. The 
first implication calls into question the rationality postulates usually advanced 
by mainstream economics to model human decision-making. By their very 
nature, optimization techniques guarantee the correspondence of substantive 
and procedural rationality if and only if all the consequences of alternative 
actions can be consistently conceived in advance, at least in a probabilistic 
sense. Unfortunately, for complex systems this possibility is generally ruled 
out, as interactive population dynamics gives rise to uncertainty that could not 
be reduced to risk in a Knightian sense3 (Rosser, 2001). In turn, noncooperative 
game theory (Shubik, 1975) does not provide a way out under rather general 
conditions. Whenever players are heterogeneous as regards their strategy and 
information sets, a full adherence to strategic behavior modeling returns 
computationally complex problems, that is problems whose solution time 
(measured as the number of simple computational steps required to solve it) 
increases exponentially in the problem size. As the number of players 
increases – for large industrialized economies, the typical order of magnitude 
of agents acting on markets is 106 − the size of the problem is too large to 
complete a search for an optimal solution within a feasible time horizon. By its 
very nature, macroeconomics is a discipline concerning large worlds (Savage, 
1954), that is situations in which economic agents do not possess well-defined 
models of the environment surrounding them.  
It turns out that as we shift attention from microeconomic scenarios to 
typical macroeconomic ones – that is, as we move from single market to multi-
market parables − the degree of rationality we can realistically ask our models’ 
characters should decline. In large worlds, deductive means of reasoning are 
inapplicable or ill-defined; individuals must instead build internal mental 
models to represent the world, learn from the outcomes of previous choices, 
and extrapolate from the particular to the general. Simply stated, agents must 
employ some form of induction (Arthur, 1992; Denzau and North, 1994).  
In large interactive systems, individual decision processes become 
unavoidably adaptive, that is adjusted in the light of realized results, and the 
                                                 
3 A possible way to define Knightian uncertainty is that the potential outcomes of an action are 
identified by two or more distributions at one time, and that these distributions are 
overlapping.    6
search for actions aimed at increasing individual performance stops as soon as 
a satisficing solution has been found (Simon, 1987). Adaptation is backward-
looking, sequential and path-dependent. Desired prices, quantities, 
inventories, portfolio compositions, even the identity of whom we would like 
to trade with are updated according to “error-correction” procedures. 
Expectations on the future course of events and results are clearly an 
important part of the decision-making process, but foresights are taken over 
finite horizons and are modified sequentially in the light of realized outcomes. 
While doing meaningful macroeconomics from a complex perspective, 
bounded rationality − both in terms of systematic reasoning errors and of 
costly deliberation activity − should be the rule, not the exception. 
In complex economies, the key driver of evolution is not optimization but 
selection. Whenever the enforcement of contracts is costly and trades occur 
through face-to-face bargaining, maximizing behavior may yield lower payoffs 
than adherence to recognizable, forecastable social norms like reciprocity and 
cooperation (Schelling, 1978). Furthermore, Witt (1986) and Dutta and Radner 
(1999) have shown that the famous as if argument used by Friedman (1953) to 
validate the profit maximization hypothesis – only firms whose managers 
maximize profits will survive in a competitive environment – does not hold 
even in more orthodox dynamical risky competitive models. In addition to 
sub-optimality at the individual level, aggregate outcomes emerging from 
selection processes need not result in the most efficient outcome (Dew et al., 
2004). We shall come back later to this point. For the moment, it must be 
noticed that the essence of this argument was made by Alchian almost six 
decades ago: “realized positive profits, not maximum profits, are the mark of success 
and viability. […] The pertinent requirement – positive profits through relative 
efficiency – is weaker than “maximized profits”, with which, unfortunately, it has been 
confused. […] The preceding interpretation suggests two ideas. First, success 
(survival) accompanies relative superiority; and, second, it does not require proper 
motivation but may rather be the result of fortuitous circumstances” (Alchian, 1950, 
p. 213).        
The second implication of the complexity approach to macroeconomics 
deals with the common practice of closing models through the exogenous 
imposition of a general equilibrium solution by means of some fixed-point 
theorems. The introduction of a Walrasian auctioneer inhibits the researcher 
from exploring the real question at stake in macroeconomics, that is to explain 
how self-interested trading partners happen to coordinate themselves in 
decentralized markets most of the time, but also why from time to time some   7
major economic disaster occurs without any apparent external cause. 
Complexity offers a way out of this situation, and it suggests new 
perspectives. Complex adaptive economies display a tendency to self-organize 
towards rather stable aggregate configurations, occasionally punctuated by 
bursts of rapid change. Spontaneous order emerges in the process of 
individual buying and selling transactions taking place in real space and time, 
without the need of any central controller. Adaptive and imitative behaviors 
give rise to stable and predictable aggregate configurations, as stability implies 
predictability and vice versa. Since it is sometimes safer to be wrong in the 
crowd than to be right alone, imbalances can now and then accumulate to the 
point that a bundle of chained bankruptcies becomes inevitable. After the 
bubble has burst and the system has experienced episodes of wild instability, 
new modes of adaptive behavior, technological opportunities and budget 
constraints co-evolve leading the economy towards a new phase of aggregate 
stability.     
Readers acquainted with Austrian economics would have already 
recognized that the picture we have just drawn embraces the notion of 
spontaneous market order put forward by Hayek (1978). According to Hayek, a 
clear definition of the laws of property, tort and contract is enough to regulate 
a set of trial and error exchange relationships, which succeeds in coordinating 
the plans of an interdependent network of individuals endowed with a 
multiplicity of competing ends. The process leading to a spontaneous market 
order takes place in real time with exchanges occurring at out-of-equilibrium 
prices, it is irreversible, and fatal errors may drive agents out of the market. In 
contrast, Hayek argues that the notion of competitive general equilibrium 
based on the tàtonnement process, be it no-trade-out-of-equilibrium version of 
Walras or the provisional contract version of Edgeworth, is “unfortunate, since 
it presupposes that the facts have already all been discovered and competition, 
therefore, has ceased” (Hayek, 1978, p.184). This is not to say that the concept of 
equilibrium should be definitely abandoned, but simply that the tendency for 
demands and supplies to adjust so that markets clear can be successfully 
explained only if we can model it as an emergent feature of economic systems. 
Since the economy is a complex network of non-linear interactions among 
adaptive agents, the meaning and the properties of a macroeconomic 
equilibrium configuration − if it exists − must be qualified, however. First, the 
presence of non-market interactions imply that decentralized and command 
solutions do not coincide. Second, even if we can operationally define a social 
welfare criterion to be somehow maximized, the surface of the objective   8
function is in general very rugged and continuously changing. Market forces 
can drive the system towards a local optimum, and adaptive and imitative 
individual behaviors may contribute to make it persistent once reached. 
However, the resulting configuration can be really far from the globally 
optimal one: market selection due to survival does not imply absolute 
individual and societal optimality.     
Of course, the complexity view to macroeconomics needs appropriate 
conceptual and analytical tools. The abandonment of the Walrasian auctioneer 
implies that market outcomes must be derived from the parallel computations 
made by a large number of interacting, heterogeneous, adaptive individuals, 
instead of being deduced as a fixed-point solution to a system of differential 
equations. The process of removal of externally imposed coordination devices 
induces a shift from a top-down, reductionist perspective towards a bottom-
up approach. Sub-disciplines of computer science like distributed artificial 
intelligence and multi-agent systems – computer programs built as loosely 
coupled networks of software agents that interact to solve problems that are 
beyond the individual capacities or knowledge of each problem solver - are 
natural fields to look at. Agent-based computational economics (ACE) – that is 
the use of computer simulations to grow and study evolving artificial 
economies composed of many autonomous interacting agents − represents a 
promising tool for advancements along the research program sketched so far 
(Judd and Tesfatsion, 2006). 
ACE models are pieces of software describing artificial economies. They 
start from the definition of a population of objects with characterizing 
attributes, a set of behavioral, communication and learning rules, and an 
environment in which interactions take place. Objects are programmed to 
pursue and assess their own self-interest, and to behave consequently – hence 
the name agents. The set of instructions defining the behavioral rules followed 
by agents reflects what we know about how actual people behave under 
alternative environmental settings, as can be elicited from the considerable 
amount of evidence available from controlled experiments with human 
subjects conducted in economics and psychology, and from survey data. 
Computational laboratories can be built by instructing software agents to 
follow specific behaviors in the context of specific economic institutions, in 
order to obtain conditional statements on the links between individual and 
aggregate phenomena. Such an approach is clearly at odds with practice 
employed by mainstream economics of axiomatically describing human 
behavior and subsequently deducing market outcomes.   9
Once initialized, the artificial economy is let free to evolve without any 
further external intervention. Simulations return artificial histories, that can be 
used for empirical and normative understanding. As argued by Epstein (2006), 
ACE models allow generative explanations. The agreement between artificial 
and real histories (measured according to some metric) demonstrates how 
aggregate structures of interest for macroeconomists – as, for instance, 
business cycles, price inflation or underemployment of resources – are 
effectively attainable starting from a given microstructure. In other words, 
target macrostructures emerge because they are effectively computable by the 
network of interacting agents, regardless of the fact that individual agents are 
not aware of it. Indeed, according to the ACE approach a market economy 
works exactly like a distributed computational device, with markets playing 
the role of social institutions aimed at mobilizing and combining bits of 
knowledge scattered throughout the economy. The legacy of Hayek’s (1948) 
thought on this view is patent.   
Interestingly enough, the improvements in mathematical methods required 
to construct virtual economies obeying the complexity approach pose serious 
challenges to the basic mathematical foundations of standard economic theory. 
Suppose we are asked to apply the same methodology of ACE models to 
Walrasian ones. Instead of asking to deductively prove the existence of an 
equilibrium price vector p* such that the aggregate excess demand function 
F(p*) = 0, we are supposed to explicitly construct it by means of an algorithm or 
rule describing how the solution may be found. Starting from an arbitrary 
price vector p, the algorithm should choose price sequences to check for p* and 
halt when it finds it. In other terms, to find the general equilibrium price 
vector  F(p*) = 0 means that halting configurations are decidable. As this 
violates the undecidability of the halting problem for Turing Machines, from a 
recursion theoretic viewpoint such a solution is uncomputable (Richter and 
Wong, 1999). As a matter of fact, ACE modeling is posed on firmer 
constructivist grounds than Walrasian microfoundations.  
As noted above, any effort aimed at grounding macroeconomic theories on 
models of individual behavior – being it associated to neoclassical or the 
complexity perspective - must be supplemented with a coherent strategy to 
assess the correctness of its explanations and predictions. Starting from Lucas 
(1980) and Kydland and Prescott (1982), advocates of the DSGE model have 
assumed that the central fact to be explained by theories of the business cycles 
is not why aggregate activity periodically falls and rises, but comovements of 
aggregate variables over time. The success or the failure of a DSGE model is   10
then obtained by comparing the correlations of the actual time-series to those 
resulting from simulations of the model using artificially generated series for a 
common technology shock, which is generally considered the ultimate source 
of fluctuations.  
Such an assessment strategy has been persuasively criticized as 
methodologically incorrect (Hartley et al., 1997). For instance, when taking to 
the data a DSGE with an RA it is not clear what we are trying to falsify, 
because conjectures regarding rationality, aggregation and general equilibrium 
are advanced simultaneously. We mostly agree with this criticism. In fact, the 
research agenda we have sketched above can easily address different and 
methodologically more correct procedures to falsify theoretical conjectures. 
Thanks to their inherent flexibility, the amount of data one can generate in 
ACE models is just a matter of computational capabilities. Empirical ex-post 
validation exercises can thus be performed, in which the artificial history of 
any single agent can be tracked and compared with its actual counterpart as 
derived from panel survey data (Bianchi et al., 2007). However, since this 
paper is mainly devoted to a comparison of two alternative methodologies to 
build macroeconomic models from sound microfoundations, a preliminary 
step is in order before we completely discard the old way for the new one. In 
particular, it seems worthwhile to evaluate if the alleged goodness of DSGE 
models in mimicking stylized facts related to comovements can be challenged 
by a rival model inspired to alternative microfoundations. That is what we 
shall try to do in Section 4.     
 
3. An ACE macroeconomic model 
In this Section we offer a prototypical ACE macroeconomic model, which 
consists in growing a sequential economy populated by a finite number of 
synthetic firms i = 1, …, I, workers/consumers, j = 1, …, J, and banks b = 1, …, 
B. Agents undertake decisions at discrete times t = 1, …, T on three markets: 1) 
a market for a homogeneous non-storable consumption good; 2) a market for 
labor services; 3) a market for credit services. Notional prices and quantities 
are chosen adaptively, according to rules of thumb buffeted by idiosyncratic 
random disturbances. Markets are characterized by decentralized search and 
matching processes, which imply individual, and a fortiori aggregate, out-of-
equilibrium dynamics. Due to the absence of any exogenously imposed 
market-clearing mechanism, the economy is allowed to self-organize towards   11
a  spontaneous order with persistent involuntary unemployment, unsold 
production, excess individual demands and credit rationing. 
The framework which follows belongs to a suite of computational 
investigations of macroeconomic processes modeled as complex adaptive 
trivial systems (C@S). Other exemplifications of the C@S approach can be 
found in Delli Gatti et al. (2005), Gaffeo et al. (2007) and Russo et al. (2007). The 
common modeling strategy is built on two pillars. First, the rules of individual 
behavior and market transactions that we translate into algorithmic language 
are inspired − where possible − to the evidence available from survey studies 
conducted by asking households and business people how they actually 
behave. Where several competing options are available, we conform to the 
dull version of the Occam’s Razor principle known as KISS.4 Second, as 
discussed at length above we do not impose any centralized solving 
mechanism. Instead, we let the system of adaptive interacting agents evolve 
autonomously towards self-organizing configurations, if they exist.   
 
3.1 The sequence of events 
The sequence of events occurring in each period runs as follows. 
1.  At the beginning of any t, firms and banks check their financial viability as 
inherited from the past. They continue to operate if their net worth (a stock 
variable equal to the sum of past retained net profits) is positive; if, on the 
contrary, net worth is lower or equal to zero, they shut down due to 
bankruptcy. In the latter case, a string of new firms/banks equal in number 
to the bankrupted ones enter the market. Entrants are simply random 
copies of incumbents.  
2.  Individual productivity can be increased by an uncertain amount thanks to 
investments in R&D, determined as a fixed fraction of the last periods gross 
profits, πit-1.  
3.  By looking at their past experience, each operating firm determines the 
amount of output to be produced (hence, the amount of labor to be hired) 
and the price. Expectations on future demand are updated adaptively. 
4.  A fully decentralized labor market opens. Firms then pay their wage bill 
Wit in order to start production. 
                                                 
4 Several interpretations of the acronym KISS circulate, most of them overlapping. The one we 
prefer is keep it short and simple.   12
5.  If internal financial resources are in short supply for paying wages, and fill 
in a fixed number of applications to obtain credit. Banks allocate credit 
collecting individual demands, sorting them in descending order according 
to the financial viability of firms, and satisfy them until all credit supply 
has been exhausted.  
6.  Production takes the whole period t, regardless of the scale of output. At 
the beginning of t, firms pay their wage bill in order to start production. If 
internal financial resources are in short supply for paying wages, firms can 
enter a fully decentralized credit market and borrow funds. The contractual 
interest rate is calculated applying a mark-up (function of financial 
viability) on a exogenously determined baseline. 
7.  After production is completed, the market for goods opens. Firms post 
their offer price, while consumers are allowed to muddle through 
searching for a satisfying deal. If a firm ends up with excess supply, it gets 
rid of the unsold goods at zero costs.  
8.  Firms collect revenues, calculate profits, update their net worth and, if 
internal resources are enough, pay back their debt obligations. 
 
3.2 Production technology 
Production is carried out by means of a constant return to scale technology, 
with labor Lit as the only input: 
 
       Yit = αit Lit,   αit > 0      (1) 
 
where  αit is labor productivity. The latter is assumed to evolve over time 
according to a first-order autoregressive stochastic process:  
 
           αit+1 = αit + zit     (2) 
 
where zit is the realization of a random process, exponentially distributed with 
mean  µit = σitπit/(pitYit), with 0 < σ < 1: the higher is the fraction of gross 
nominal profits (π) invested in R&D (scaled by nominal sales pY), the higher is 
the expected increase in productivity. Hence, firms’ investment in R&D may 
vary either because of variations in profits and because of variations of the 
behavioral parameter σ. In simulations, σ will be allowed to increase with the 
amount of gross nominal profits, according to a step function. Equation (2) and   13
the operational underlying assumptions can be seen as a reduced form 
reflecting theoretical and empirical considerations suggested by a profusion of 
studies on the determinants of corporate R&D investment (Reynard, 1979; 
Fazzari and Athey, 1987).  
In line with the literature on capital market imperfections, in our setting the 
amount of internal liquidity or net worth is the key variable measuring firms’ 
viability. Put in the complexity perspective, this conjectures implies that the 
dynamics of operating cash flows drives selection mechanisms. The law of 
motion of net worth, Ait, is given by: 
 
    Ait = Ait-1 + (1 - σit-1) π it-1.  (3) 
 
Net worth is used to finance working capital. Firms can also borrow 
external funds − if internal ones are insufficient − from a banking sector. 
Clearly, the higher the amount of debt a firm has, the higher is the probability 
of failing to repay it, ceteris paribus. In fact, if the net worth turns out to be 
negative, the firm becomes technically insolvent, and it is declared bankrupt. 
As a consequence, it exits the market and is replaced by a new entrant. 
From the discussion above, it appears that firms face a trade-off when 
allocating operating profits between increasing productivity through R&D 
investment and limiting the resort to debt. Both decisions impinge on the 
probability a firm has to survive, but in opposite directions. 
 
3.3 The labor market 
Firms set their labor demand 
d
it L  on the basis of their desired level of 
production, 
d
it Y . We will show momentarily how the latter is determined. 
From equation (1), it follows that the number of job openings set by firm i at 
time t is simply given by: 
 








= .       ( 6 )  
 
We assume that workers supply inelastically one unit of labor per period. 
Each worker sends M applications to as many firms: the first one to the firm in 
which he worked in the previous period (if employed), and M–1 at random (M 
if unemployed in t–1). Workers are therefore characterized by a sort of loyalty   14
to their last employer on the one hand, and on the other by a desire to insure 
themselves against the risk of unemployment by diversifying in a portfolio of 
hiring opportunities.  
The ith firm organizes all received applications into two blocks. The first 
one is composed by all its previous employees, as employers respond to the 
loyalty of their workforce by assuring them a priority in their hiring policy. 
The second block of the queue, in turn, is filled in by all other applicants. Firm 
i may face two alternative situations:  
a)  1 - it
d
it L L ≤ , that is the desired labor demand at time t is lower than the 
number of people employed during the previous period. In this case, the last 
d
it it L L − 1 -  workers (i.e., the ones with higher inherited wages) queuing in the 
first block are fired, while the remaining are kept. Fired workers have other M-
1 opportunities to find a job elsewhere.  
b)  1 - it
d
it L L > , that is firm i wants to increase its workforce. In this case, i 
keeps all its past employees and looks for  1 - it
d
it L L −  new workers, who are 
selected from the second block of the queue.  
Decentralized labor markets (i.e., one for each firm) are closed sequentially 
according to an order randomly chosen at each time step. Given that each 
worker is allowed to sign one labor contract per period, serious coordination 
failures could arise as the number of workers actually available does not 
necessarily correspond to the one inscribed in queues, especially for firms 
which are called to hire their workers late in the sequence. 
When hired for the first time by a firm, a worker is asked to sign a contract 
which determines his nominal wage level for a fixed number of periods. The 
wage offered to him by firm i in period t is calculated according to the 
following rule:       
 
                            ( ) ( ) it it t
b
it w w w ξ τ + = − 1 , max )     (7) 
 
where  t w ˆ  is a minimum wage imposed by the law, while wit-τ is the wage 
offered to the cohort of workers employed the last time firm i hired (period τ, 
with τ ≥ 1). Finally, ξit is an idiosyncratic shock uniformly distributed on the 
non-negative interval (0,hξ). Workers who succeed in receiving more than one 
proposal accept the one which pays the higher wage. 
The minimum wage is periodically revised upward, in order to neutralize 
price inflation. Wages contracted in previous periods which happen to fall   15
below the minimum wage are automatically updated to it.5 Besides hedging 
workers against the risk of losing purchasing power due to inflation, the 
updating of the minimum wage contributes to couple firms with their 
environment. For instance, in periods of tight labor market firms which are 
hiring increase their output price to preserve profit margins. Higher prices, in 
turn, drive the minimum wage upwards as an externality. The process works 
the opposite way when the market for labor is dull.  
The labor market design we choose is consistent with the findings reported 
by numerous surveys of firms’ wage-setting policies. First, there is clear 
evidence of nominal wage downward rigidity. Firms are particularly resistant 
to cut nominal wages even during recessions because they fear that lower 
wage rates would increase turnover and decrease labor effort (Campbell and 
Kamlani, 1997; Bewley, 1999). Second, downward rigidity is observed also for 
the pay of new hired, probably for reasons of perceived equity (Bewley, 1999). 
Finally, there is clear evidence that individual real wages are not fully 
insulated against inflation (Baker et al., 1994). 
   
3.3 The market for the consumption good 
At the beginning of each time period, firms can adaptively adjust their price 
and their output level to make an allowance for changed business conditions. 
In spite of the good being homogeneous, asymmetric information and search 
costs imply that consumers may end up buying from a firm regardless of its 
price not being the lowest. It follows that conditions for perfect competition 
are not satisfied, and the law of one price does not necessarily apply (Stiglitz, 
1989).  
For simplicity, we constrain the two strategies to be mutually incompatible. 
Therefore, at each time period firms can choose to vary the quantity or the 
price. Such a dichotomy is aimed at reflecting the evidence on survey data on 
price and quantity adjustment of firms over the business cycle (Kawasaki et al., 
1982; Bhaskar et al., 1993). While for expositional simplicity in this paper we 
retain the assumption that each non-mutual action is ex-ante equally likely, 
nothing prevents in principle from calibrating such a probability according to 
real data. For instance, the available evidence suggests that for firms without 
                                                 
5 In simulations, we fixed the duration of contracts to 8 periods, while the minimum wage is 
revised every 4 periods. If we assume that one simulation period corresponds to a quarter, this 
means that labor contracts last two years, while the minimum wage is revised annually.    16
cash-flow problems price adjustments are more likely during recessions than 
during booms, whereas the reverse is true for quantity adjustments; while 
liquidity constrained firms are less likely to cut prices in recessions.    
In our model, the revision strategy for both options depends on signals 
coming from an analysis of internal operating conditions and from the market. 
Let us describe the two adjustment mechanisms in turn. As regards prices, we 
assume that firms and consumers operate in a posted offer market. Prices are 
set considering the unsold quantities during the last period (Sit-1), the costs 
incurred in production, and the deviation of individual prices from the 
average price index during the last transaction round. Internal conditions are 
private knowledge, while the aggregate price index P during the previous 
round is common knowledge. More precisely, the ith manager sets his 
satisficing selling price according to the following rule: 
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where  ηit is an idiosyncratic random variable uniformly distributed on a 
positive support (0,hη), and 
l
it P  is the lowest price at which firm i is able to 
cover its average costs: 
 





P = .       (9) 
 
The remaining combinations of signals regarding involuntary inventories 
and relative prices trigger adjustments of quantities. In this case, the level of 
production planned at the beginning of period t (
d





it D Y = . Expectations on future total orders are revised adaptively 
according to: 
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where ρit is an idiosyncratic shock uniformly distributed on a positive support 
(0,hρ). Thus, expectations are revised upward if a manager observes excess   17
demand for its output and its price is already above the average price on the 
market, and downward when the opposite holds true. 
Aggregate demand depends on the total wage bill paid by firms to workers 
employed in t-1. The marginal propensity to consume out of labor income c 
varies according to the worker’s total wealth, defined as the sum of labor 
income plus all accumulated past savings. These latter, in turn, are due to a 
typical precautionary motive in the face of income uncertainty: households 
hold assets to shield their consumption against unpredictable declines in 
income associated with spells of unemployment. In line with empirical 
evidence from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (Souleles, 1999), as well as 
with predictions from the theory of consumption under uncertainty (Carroll 
and Kimball, 1996), the marginal propensity c of our artificial consumers is 
assumed to decline with personal wealth.  
Given the lack of any market-clearing mechanism, and that bargains on the 
good market are fully decentralized, consumers have to search for satisfying 
deals. The information acquisition technology is defined in terms of the 
number of firms Z a consumer can visit without incurring any cost. In other 
words, search costs are null as the consumer enters the market, continue to be 
null if he remains confined to his local market of size Z, but they become 
prohibitively high as soon as a consumer tries to search outside it. In what 
follows, the identity of the Z firms associated to a generic consumer j at any 
time period t is determined by a combination of chance and deterministic 
persistence. The search mechanism works as follows. Consumers enter the 
market sequentially, the picking order being determined randomly at any time 
period t. Each purchaser j is allowed to visit Z firms to detect the price posted 
by each one of them. In order to minimize the probability to be rationed, he 
visits for sure the larger (in terms of production) firm visited during the 
previous round, while the remaining Z-1 firms are chosen at random. Thus, 
consumers adopt a preferential-attachment scheme, where preference is given 
to the biggest firms. Posted prices (and the corresponding firms) are then 
sorted in ascending order, from the lowest to the highest. Consumer j tries to 
spend a fraction c out of the labor income gained in period (t-1) - if employed - 
or of accumulated past savings - if unemployed - in goods of the cheapest firm 
in his local market. If the cheapest firm has not enough available output to 
satisfy j’s needs, the latter tries to spend his remaining income buying from the 
firm with the second lowest price, and so on. If j does not succeed in spending 
his whole income after he visited Z firms, he saves (involuntary) what remains   18
for the following periods. For the sake of simplicity, the interest rate on 
savings is assumed to be equal to 0. 
After the market for consumption goods has closed, the ith firm has made 
sales for Qit, at the price Pit. Accordingly, i’s revenues are Rit = PitQit. Due to the 
decentralized buying-selling process among firms and consumers, it is 
possible that a firm remains with unsold quantities (Sit>0). In the following 
period, the variable S will be used as a signal in adjusting firms’ prices or 
quantities, as explained above. 
 
3.5 The credit market 
If the net worth Ait is insufficient to pay for the current period wage bill, firm i 
can try to obtain additional funds by borrowing from one of a fixed number N 
of banks. The demand for credit is therefore simply given by: 
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Each bank offers the generic firm i a standard single-period debt contract, 





= l  is i’s leverage 
ratio − and the corresponding repayment schedule: 
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The contractual interest rate offered by bank n to firm i is determined as a 
mark-up over a discount rate set by a central monetary authority, which for 
simplicity we assume to be constant: 
 
          ( ) ( ) it nt it r r l µ φ + = 1     (13) 
 
with µ ’ > 0, while φnt is a random function with positive support (0, hφ). The 
mark-up the bank charges over the official discount rate reflects a risk 
premium which increases with the financial fragility of the borrower. Equation 
(13) can be seen as a reduced form from a model in which commercial banks   19
can insure themselves against potential losses by borrowing from a central 
b a n k  w h i c h  a c t s  a s  a  l e n d e r  o f  l a s t  r e s o r t  ( R e f . ) .  A  b y - p r o d u c t  o f  t h i s  l a s t  
assumption is that firms are never credit-constrained, since banks can obtain 
additional funds from the central monetary authority and price-discriminate 
among borrowers according to their quality. Finally, the stochastic shock φ 
captures random variations in banks’ operating costs.   
We assume that the demand for credit is indivisible, so that at each time 
period a firm can borrow from just one bank. A firm which needs external 
finance to implement its desired production program can explore the bank 
loan market by randomly picking H, with 0 < H < N, trials. Such a firm then 
sorts the offers it receives in ascending order, and chooses the bank ranked 
first.  
 
4. Simulation results 
In order to explore the general properties of the model, we simulate a baseline 
version recurring to the set of parameters presented in Table 1. All parameter 
values are allowed except those that create degenerating dynamical paths 
identifiable by visual inspection and conventional numerical values.6 In 
particular, no attempt is made at this stage to calibrate the model − for 
instance, by means of genetic algorithms − so that simulation outcomes are 
forced to replicate some pre-selected empirical regularities. As we will see, in 
spite of this limitation the model works fine along several margins. An 
extensive analysis of robustness to changes in parameters through Montecarlo 
methods, as well as computational experiments based on the design of 









                                                 
6 Examples of degenerate dynamics we want to avoid are extremely unstable aggregate GDP 
paths, average rates of bankruptcy and unemployment over 50%, and average rates of 
annualized inflation out of the interval ±10000%.   20
Table 1. Parameters. 
 
            Parameter                                                          Value 
I  Number of consumers        500 
J  Number of firms            100 
B  Number of banks                10 
T  Number of time periods      1000 
cP  Propensity to consume of poor people        1  
cR  Propensity to consume of rich people     0.5 
σP  R&D investment of poor firms                              0 
σR  R&D investment of rich firms                            0.1 
hξ          Maximum growth rate of wages                     0.05 
Hη         Maximum  growth rate of prices                      0.1    
Hρ         Maximum growth rate of quantities                0.1 
Hφ         Maximum amount of banks’ costs                   0.1 
Z  Number of trials in the goods market       2 
M  Number of trials in the labor market                   4 
H         Number of trials in the credit market                 2 
 
As a general principle, the usefulness of a model is assessed by comparing 
its theoretical predictions with a selected set of explananda. What do we mean 
by successful ACE macroeconomic theorizing, then? From the perspective we 
took in Section 2, we believe that at least two questions are of key importance 
whenever one tries to do useful macroeconomic theory outside the rationality-
cum-equilibrium approach. First, a macroeconomic model should be able to 
display, as a general feature, the ability to self-organize most of the time, but 
also to occasionally display severe coordination failures yielding great 
depressions without necessarily recurring to negative aggregate shocks. 
Models based on the Walrasian general equilibrium approach, on the contrary, 
usually possess the unsatisfactory property to exhibit either regular behavior 
all the time (whenever a stable equilibrium exists), or permanent degenerate 
behavior (whenever the previous condition do not hold). Second, the model 
should be able to replicate, at least qualitatively, one or more of the 
macroeconomic stylized facts which are known to hold for the majority of 
industrialized countries. In particular, we are interested in building a virtual 
environment able to capture the emergence of aggregate regularities as the 
result of dispersed market and non-market interactions of a multitude of 
heterogeneous agents.     21
While the latter two points put the emphasis on qualitative assessment 
strategies to corroborate theoretical predictions from ACE models, it must be 
acknowledged that additional quantitative methods − in terms of ex-post 
validation − can be naturally devised. We prefer here to stick to qualitative 
measures of success, however, since this allows us to make a more direct 
comparison between our proposal and the DSGE research program. This could 
sound odd, since DSGE models are usually taken to the data by comparing 
quantitative theoretical predictions with figures summarizing key features of 
cyclical fluctuations in real economies. This impression is largely false, 
however. Since no formal metric is offered to measure the closeness of the 
model data to the actual data, the assessment exercise presented in almost 
every DSGE paper is ultimately qualitative. Hence, instead of reproducing the 
familiar table of figures based on actual and simulated data, we prefer to 
illustrate the performance of our ACE model in replicating first-order features 
of real economies with graphical methods. 
In the following we will see that our ACE model can generate i) a rather 
stable aggregate dynamics punctuated by sudden crisis; ii) emergent 
macroeconomic regularities, like parallel paths of the average labor 
productivity and real wage, a Phillips curve and an Okun curve; and finally iii) 
comovements among aggregate variables.  Regarding this last point, the 
benchmark we use against simulation outcomes is the postwar U.S. economy. 
In particular, filtered-detrended7 quarterly data for real GDP, employment, 
labor productivity, real wages, inflation and bank loan interest rates obtained 
from the Federal Reserve web-based FRED database have been used to 
calculate leads and lags correlations.   
In Figure 1 we present the dynamics of (log) real GDP (a), the rate of 
unemployment (b), the annual inflation rate (c) and the dynamics of labor 
productivity and real wage (d) for a representative simulation parameterized 
according to Table 1. Only the last 500 simulated periods are considered, in 






                                                 
7 We use the Hodrick-Prescott filter with the smoothing parameter λ set at 1400.   22
Figure 1. Emergent macroeconomic dynamics from simulations. (a) Real GDP; (b) rate 
of unemployment; (c) annual rate of inflation; (d) productivity (solid line) and real 
wage (dotted line).  
              (a)                   (b)  
                                      
 
                   (c)                   (d) 
                                     
 
The time path of aggregate activity is characterized by sustained growth, 
punctuated by sudden, deep and rather short crisis. In our simulations, big 
depressions are due to the failure of big firms, a phenomenon well known to 
occur in the real world but systematically ignored by standard macroeconomic 
theory. It is worth noting that during depressions the unemployment of 
resources, here summarized by labor, average productivity and average real 
wages follow a path similar to that of aggregate economic activity. If we let 
each simulated time period correspond to one quarter, in our simulations the 
per-year probability to experience an economic disaster is comprised between 
0.8% and 1.7%. These figures are just slightly lower than estimates reported by   23
Barro (2006), according to whom the per-year probability of a big depression 
(i.e., a drop in real GDP of 15% or higher) in OECD countries during the last 
100 years is in the range 1.5 – 2%. Notice, however, that Barro includes wars 
into his calculation of major disruptions. Furthermore, in line with the long-
run experience of industrialized countries, simulated data suggest that great 
depressions represent transitory disturbances, in that the long-run real GDP 
growth path is not sensibly affected by major displacements.  
Simulations have shown that the severity and likeliness of economic 
disaster depend positively on the importance we assign to the preferential-
attachment scheme followed by consumers when searching in the goods 
market. This makes sense: if customers spread more equally over the market, 
the probability of finding a really big firm, and a fortiori the probability of 
finding a really big firm on the verge of bankruptcy, is lower.  
In addition to great depressions, the growth path of aggregate output is 
characterized by fluctuations resembling business cycles. The model is able to 
generate an alternation of aggregate booms and recessions as a non-linear 
combination of idiosyncratic shocks affecting individual decision-making 
processes. The account of business cycles offered by the C@S model thus 
contrasts sharply with DSGE theory, according to which fluctuations in 
aggregate activity are explained by random variations in aggregate TFP 
growth.  
Even though no serious attempt to calibrate the model has been made, our 
model does not display pathological phenomena, nor degenerate dynamics. 
The unemployment rate ranges between 1% and 15%, while the yearly rate of 
inflation is on average equal to 3%, it reaches a high at around 16%, and turns 
occasionally into moderate deflationary episodes. As shown in panel (d), real 
wages and productivity follow a similar pattern. Since we do not impose any 
aggregate equilibrium relationship between the two variables, the (on average) 
constancy of income shares over time is just an emerging feature of a self-
organizing system of heterogeneous interacting agents. 
Some other interesting stylized facts emerging from simulated 
decentralized interactions are depicted in Figure 2. In panel (a) a weak, 
although statistically significant, negative relationship between the rate of 
wage inflation and the rate of unemployment – that is, a standard Phillips 
curve − can be detected. Panel (b) shows that a negative relationship between 
the output growth rate and the unemployment growth rate – i.e., an Okun 
curve – characterizes the system dynamics. A third emerging regularity   24
regarding the labor market is the Beveridge curve reported in Panel (c), 
showing a negative relationship between the rate of vacancies (here proxied by  
 
Figure 2. Phillips (a), Okun (b) and Beveridge (c) curves, and the firms’ size 
distribution (d) generated by simulations. 
              (a)                   (b)  
                            
             (c)                   (d)  
       
 
the ratio between the number of job openings and the labor force at the 
beginning of a period) and the rate of unemployment. Finally, Panel (d) shows 
the firms’ size distribution, with size measured by production. As in real 
industrialized economies, the distribution is highly skewed to the right: firms 
with small and medium size dominate the economy; large firms are relatively 
rare, but they represent a large part of total supply. When the firms’ size 
distribution is skewed, the mean firm size is larger than the median one, and   25
both are larger than the modal firm size. Clearly, in this case the very notion of 
a representative firm is meaningless. 
As reported above, for reasons of space a proper robustness check via 
Montecarlo explorations of the parameter space is left for further research. 
Nevertheless, we believe that the evidence here reported is sufficient to convey 
the idea that identifiable aggregate regularities may easily appear from the 
complex interactions of heterogeneous adaptive adjustments on different 
margins, technological innovation, limited searches and out-of-equilibrium 
decentralized transactions on three interrelated markets. Mainstream 
economic theory, with its emphasis on equilibrium outcomes from hyper-
rational representative household and firm, encounters enormous difficulties 
in jointly explaining such a rich list of phenomena. For instance, basically all 
modern theories attempting to explain the Great Depression which hit the 
world economy during 1929-39 treat this episode as an outlier, and rely on a 
rather ad-hoc combination of severe frictions, technological and policy shocks 
(Chary et al., 2002). ACE models, on the contrary, can naturally accommodate 
the alternation of phases of smooth growth and sudden crisis as instances of 
the same underlying dynamical process. 
An obvious critique to our conclusions is that an appropriate comparison 
between the C@S family and more traditional DSGE models can be made only 
if the same testing methodology is used. According to DSGE scholars, the 
performance of models of the business cycle has to be measured in terms of 
their ability to replicate aggregate phenomena at cyclical frequencies along 
three dimensions: persistence, volatility and comovements of key variables 
with output. In this paper we start to explore the ability of our ACE virtual 
economy to challenge DSGE models by mainly focusing on the latter 
dimension. 
Results are reported in Figure 3, where we plot the cross-correlations with 
output at four leads and lags of employment (a), productivity (b), the price 
index (c), the interest rate on loans (d) and the real wage (e). Each panel is 
completed by the corresponding function calculated from real data and a ±20% 
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Figure 3. Cyclical features of model-generated and real data. Solid lines show sample 
moments, while dashed lines show moments generated by simulations. (a) 
Employment; (b) productivity; (c) price index; (d) interest rate; (e) real wage; (f) GDP 
transitory impulse-response function. 
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The model of Section 3 does a good job in four cases out of five. From 
simulations we find that employment and productivity are highly correlated   27
with contemporaneous output; prices are slightly negatively correlated and 
anticipate output; while the interest rate is a-cyclical. All these patterns mimic 
the evidence for the U.S. economy remarkably well. The simulated real wage 
turns out to be pro-cyclical, as in real data, but fails to anticipate cyclical 
movements of aggregate activity by two to three quarters.  
Finally, panel (f) of Figure 3 presents the transitory impulse-response 
functions, calculated by means of an AR(2) estimate, for the actual (solid line) 
and the model-generated (dashed line) output, respectively. The simulated 
model can mimic the hump-shaped response of cyclical output to transitory 
shocks – a feature that first-generation RBC models failed to capture (Cogley 
and Nason, 1995) − thought the peak in real data precedes the simulated one 
by one quarter. The trend-reverting dynamics is nevertheless really similar. 
Reminding that all these results have been obtained without any serious 
effort to calibrate the model, we argue that the C@S basic setup proves to 
display rich and interesting aggregate and disaggregated dynamics under 
rather general conditions on the one hand, and that on the other, it can also 
successfully challenge the explanatory power of neoclassical models when 
confined to their same ground.  
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we sketch the basics of a research program aimed at providing 
microfoundations to macroeconomics, moving from premises dissimilar to the 
rationality-cum-equilibrium methodology followed by the neoclassical 
mainstream theory. Although the perspective we offer – that is, one based on 
heterogeneity, adaptation, bounded rationality and an explicit analysis of 
decentralized market processes − can be firmly rooted in the history of 
economic thought, its full disclosure requires the development of new 
analytical and computable tools. Among them, we argue that the ACE 
approach is particularly promising, for at least three reasons. First, agent-
based simulations allow a remarkable degree of flexibility in modeling human 
behavior. Instead of deducing aggregate relationships from the maximization 
problem of a fully rational representative individual and the imposition of 
general market clearing, artificial agents can be instructed to behave in accord 
with evidence resulting from experimental research and econometric work 
using field data. Second, artificial markets and institutional settings can be 
constructed by imposing a pre-ordered structure of interactions or,   28
alternatively, the latter can be allowed to spontaneously emerge from the 
algorithmic description of simple searching heuristics. In both cases, the net of 
incentives and constraints which feed back and forth between individual and 
social behavior shapes demand, supply and price formation, as well as the 
relationships between growth and business cycles. Third, the ACE approach 
allows researchers to easily keep track of individual and aggregate outcomes 
as the simulation goes on, and to assess the sensibility of these outcomes to 
changes in the environment. Once built, an ACE model becomes a 
computational laboratory in which several experiments can be made with 
negligible marginal costs. 
Moving from these premises, we introduce a prototypical member of a class 
of computational agent-based macroeconomic models, the so-called C@S 
family. We show that the system dynamics generated during simulations can 
accommodate a large set of stylized facts regarding the long-run and medium-
run performance of industrialized countries. In particular, we take up the 
gauntlet flung down by the neoclassical school, according to which models of 
the business cycle should be assessed in terms of their ability to mimic 
correlations of aggregate variables. In fact, when tested against U.S. data our 
model can challenge DSGE models in their aptitude to account for business 
cycle stylized facts.  
Beyond a mere ability to match selected statistical regularities, the model 
we present is aimed at joining those proposed among the others by Clower 
and Howitt (2000) and LeBaron (2001), to demonstrate that ACE may 
represent a practical and effective substantiation of the Post Walrasian 
approach to macroeconomics (Colander, 1996; 2006). In particular, we argue 
that the methodology discussed in the previous sections of this paper can 
eventually bring us to successfully tackle several macroeconomic issues 
remained so far largely unsolved. An example we are planning to address in 
the near future is the following. According to Leijonuhfvud (1996), in properly 
modeling economies with increasing returns one should abandon the reduced-
form externality view proposed by the neoclassical endogenous growth 
theory, to rediscover instead the time-honored Smithian pin-factory parable. 
According to this view, the economy is conceived as a nonlinear input-output 
system of production, in which firms show increasing returns to scale and 
every firm uses intermediate inputs that are produced by others. This system 
of interrelated firms turns out to display increasing returns in the aggregate if 
and only if firms overcome coordination failures due to opportunistic hold-
ups. In fact, the hold-up of just one input or output can cascade through the   29
system, leaving many firms without an essential input, which in turn fail to 
deliver their output to still others, and so on. An implementable research 
agenda consists in setting up an ACE laboratory along these lines, in order not 
only to study causal relationships between the design of contracts and 
procurement processes but also the emergence of recessions, bubbles, liquidity 
constraints, supply-demand disequilibria and pathological price dynamics. 
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